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FINANCERS AS FIDUCIARIES:
AN EXAMINATION OF RECENT TRENDS IN
LENDER LIABILITY
PETR G. PMRCE III*
ALvm C. HARREuL**
The number of cases discussing the existence and scope of an obligation
of good faith and fair dealing in borrower-lender relations is sufficiently
numerous today that there is now an annotation on the subject.' Yet, at the
same time there is an emerging consensus that some courts have gone too
far in utilizing the good faith concept and other theories to rewrite loan
documents or to impose a standard of justice compatible with an appellate
court's personal conscience. 2 At best, a number of the lender liability deci-
sions are "not the product of a carefully thought-through plan." 3 The pur-
pose of this article is to analyze these cases in the context of efforts to impose
fiduciary-like duties on the parties to a loan transaction.
Implied Duties of Good Faith in Oklahoma:
The Impact of Rodgers v. Tecumseh Bank
In an important recent case, Rodgers v. Tecumseh Bank,4 the Oklahoma
Supreme Court shed considerable light on its view of the good faith-fair deal-
ing aspects of lender liability cases. In this case the court declined to recognize
a commercial loan agreement as the basis for the creation of a special or
fiduciary relationship per se. It also held that absent a special relationship
between the parties or gross recklessness or wanton negligence on behalf of
a party to a contract, the violation of a resultant duty sounds in contract alone.5
Outside the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) and insurance cases (which
are rooted in statute), no Oklahoma decision with precedential effect has found
an implied covenant to act in accordance with any special standard of good
faith or fair dealing in a lending agreement as a matter of general contract
* B.A., 1971, University of Oklahoma; J.D., 1974, Southern Methodist University. Partner,
Oklahoma City firm of Carson, Pierce, Mueller & Huffman.
** Visiting Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma College of Law. B.S., M.B.A., J.D.,
Oklahoma City University; L.L.M., Southern Methodist University.-Ed.
1. Annot., Bank's Liability for Breach of Implied Contract of Good Faith and Fair Deal-
ing, 55 A.L.R.4th 1026 (1987).
2. See, e.g., Granoff, Emerging Theories of Lender Liability: Flawed Application of Old
Concepts, 104 BANK L.J. 492 (1987). Mr. Granoff successfully represented Centerre Bank of
Kansas City in an appeal of a multimillion-dollar jury verdict.
3. Ebke & Griffin, Lender Liability to Debtors: Toward a Conceptual Framework, 40 S.W.
L.J. 775, 813 (1986).
4. Rodgers v. Tecumseh Bank, 756 P.2d 1223, (Okla. 1988).
5. Id. at 1227.
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law. Further, no Oklahoma decision has found that an aggrieved party may
recover punitive damages in tort for breach of such an agreement. In the con-
text of the acceleration of loan payments under UCC section 1-208,6 the
Oklahoma Supreme Court has ruled that a creditor's good faith belief in
default or insecurity is to be judged by an objective standard of good faith
based on commercial reasonableness, 7 despite the fact that the definition of
"good faith" applicable to that section' requires only honesty in fact and
does not incorporate standards of commercial reasonableness.9 But in cases
not involving a statute, contractual provision, or confidential relationship im-
posing special liabilities based on a fiduciary duty or an obligation of com-
mercial good faith and fair dealing, such duties, or a tort remedy for their
breach, will probably not be implied in Oklahoma. A brief review of recent
case law provides support for this conclusion.
The Implied Covenant in Oklahoma
Prior to Rodgers v. Tecumseh Bank, it was not clear whether or to what
extent there was an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in lend-
ing transactions in Oklahoma. In 1936 the Oklahoma Supreme Court, in
Wright v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland,'0 quoted the New York Court
of Appeals for the proposition that every contract contains an implied cove-
nant that neither party shall do anything that will destroy or injure another
party's right to receive the fruits of the contract." In Wright the court also
quoted from a Texas Court of Civil Appeals decision 2 that spoke conserva-
tively about implying covenants in contracts." Those citations were made in
the context of the court extending a surety's obligation of "faithful perform-
ance" in a contractor's bond to cover fraudulent overcharges; even though
the bond did not mention "honesty" or "fidelity," the term "faithful" was
construed to include those concepts.' 4 This is a far cry, however, from im-
posing special standards of good faith and fair dealing in every lending
transaction.
Similarly, in 1985 in Hall v. Farmer's Ins. Exchange," the Oklahoma
Supreme Court noted that "each contract carries an implicit and mutual cove-
6. 12A OKLA. STAT. § 1-208 (1981).
7. Mitchell v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 688 P.2d 42, 45 n.5 (Okla. 1984). In the opinion
by Justice Opala, Professor Gilmore's 1965 treatise on Security Interests in Personal Property
and a 1962 University of Chicago Law Review article are cited as authority (citations omitted).
8. 12A OKLA. STAT. § 1-201(19) (Supp. 1988). Hereinafter references to the UCC are to
the Offical Text, unless otherwise noted.
9. The definition of "good faith" in the case of a merchant at 12A OKA. STAT. § 2-103(l)(b)
(1981) does incorporate standards of commercial reasonableness, but this standard should not
be applicable in a lending transaction outside Article 2. See, e.g., Sherrock v. Commercial Credit
Corp., 290 A.2d 648 (Dei. 1972).
10. 176 Okla. 274, 54 P.2d 1084, 1087 (1936).
11. Kirke LaShelle Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co., 263 N.Y. 79, 188 N.E. 163, 164 (1933).
12. Humble Oil Ref. Co. v. Reclamation Co., 58 S.W.2d 1082 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933), writ
dismissed.
13. 176 Okla. 274, 54 P.2d at 1087.
14. Id., 54 P.2d at 1086-87.
15. 713 P.2d 1027 (Okla. 1985).
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nant by the parties to act toward each other in good faith."' 6 Without proper
attribution, the court quoted from the two New York Court of Appeals cases
cited in Wright v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland.7 In Hall the court
found an implied covenant of good faith in an insurance agency contract con-
taining a termination-at-will clause. The court held that the insurance com-
pany principal could be liable for damages for termination made pursuant
to its printed form agreement (imposed on all agents) if that termination op-
tion was exercised in bad faith.'8 The court stated that if the insurance com-
pany principal acted with an intent to wrongfully deprive the agent of the
fruits of his contract when it terminated his agency, it would stand in breach
of the implied covenant of good faith. 9 The court used as its standard of
conduct the nineteenth-century general defimition of good faith, 20 which means
both honesty in fact and lack of unconscionable use of what is technically
lawful.2 1 Because the principal invoked its termination clause in bad faith,
the law gave the agent a remedy of contractual damages commensurate with
the injury caused.22 Notably, this was once again based on the common law
concept of good faith, and recovery was limited to contract damages.
Prior to Hall, the Oklahoma Supreme Court addressed the issue of "good
faith" in a lending context in Mitchell v. Ford Motor Credit Co.23 That case
turned, however, not on the common law implication but on section 1-208
of the UCC. 24 The court held that the creditor's good faith belief that it was
either insecure so as to invoke the acceleration clause in a security agreement
or that a default existed is to be judged by an objective standard based upon
commercial reasonableness. 2 As noted, this holding is curious because the
applicable definition of "good faith" in the UCC requires only honesty in
fact and does not incorporate standards of commercial reasonableness.
26
However, the case is distinguishable from those involving general contract
issues because it was governed largely by the UCC.
At the time the Oklahoma Supreme Court was applying the implied-in-law
good faith covenant to termination-at-will clauses in insurance agency
16. Id. at 1029.
17. Nikulnikoff v. Archbishop, 142 Misc. 894, 255 N.Y.S. 653, 660 (1932), and Kirke LaShelle
Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co., 263 N.Y. 79, 188 N.E. 163, 164 (1933), quoted in Wright v. Fidelity
& Deposit Co. of Maryland, 176 Okla. 274, 54 P.2d 1084, 1087 (1936). See 713 P.2d at 1029-30.
18. 713 P.2d at 1031.
19. Id. at 1030.
20. Id. at 1031 n.8.
21. See 25 OKiA. STAT. § 9 (1981).
22. 713 P.2d at 1031.
23. 688 P.2d 42 (Okla. 1984).
24. 12A OKIA. STAT. § 1-208 (1981). Discretionary acceleration of payment or performance
is tempered by "good faith" exercise of that discretion. "Good faith" means honesty in fact
in the conduct or transaction concerned. 12A OKLA. STAT. § 1-201(19) (Supp. 1988).
25. 688 P.2d at 44-45.
26. The definition of "good faith" in the case of a merchant under Article 2-Sales, 12A
OKLA. STAT. § 2-103(a)(b) (1981), does incorporate standards of commercial reasonableness, but
this standard should not be applicable in a lending transaction outside Article 2. See, e.g., Sherrock
v. Commercial Credit Corp., 290 A.2d 648 (Del. 1972).
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agreements, the Oklahoma Court of Appeals, in Eke Builders, Inc. v. Quail
Bluff Assoc. ,1 held (without citing any Oklahoma authority) that an im-
plied covenant of good faith and fair dealing exists in all contracts, not merely
the construction contract involved in that case.2" The exact language of the
court bears repeating:
An implied covenant to act in good faith and deal fairly inhered
in the [construction] contract. Its bad faith breach carried with
it the consequences described in Christian v. American Home Assur.
Co ..... The same principle applies to contracts generally. See,
e.g., Transcontainer Services v. Security Forwarders, Inc., 752 F.2d
483 (9th Cir. 1985); Seaman's Direct Buysing Service, Inc. v. Stan-
dard Oil Co., 36 Cal.2d 752, 686 P.2d 1158 (1984).29
In Eke Builders the Oklahoma Court of Appeals bootstrapped the special
good faith obligation, implied from statute in insurance contracts in cases
such as Christian v. American Home Assurance Co., 30 into a construction
contract to allow punitive damages on a theory of tortious breach of con-
tract. As noted, no Oklahoma authority was cited. These authors believe that
despite Wright and Hall, this kind of special covenant of good faith and fair
dealing does not clearly apply to contracts generally in Oklahoma. The two
cases cited by the Eke Builders court in the quotation above are not persuasive.
The Transcontainer Services decision was decided by the Ninth Circuit on
the basis of the lien law of the United Kingdom. The Seaman's Direct Buying
Service case is a per curiam opinion simply citing established California law
that such a covenant is implied in every California contract."
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 205 adopts the California
line of cases, but thus far has not been widely followed. The Texas Supreme
Court recently characterized that position as: "[A] novel theory of law enun-
ciated only by California courts ... which would abolish our system of govern-
ment according to settled rules of law and let each case be decided upon what
might seem 'fair and in good faith,' by each fact finder." 32 The Texas Supreme
27. 714 P.2d 604 (Okla. Ct. App. 1985). This decision was authored by Judge Brightmire
and concurred in by one other judge. It was released for publication by order of the Court
of Appeals and, therefore, is not accorded precedential value but may be cited as persuasive.
12 OKLA. STAT. ch. 15 app. 2 Rule 1.200C(B) (Supp. 1987).
28. 714 P.2d at 608.
29. Id.
30. 577 P.2d 899, 902 (Okla. 1977).
31. See also Perdue v. Crocker Nat'l Bank, 38 Cal. 3d 913, 702 P.2d 503, 216 Cal. Rptr.
345 (1985), appeal dismLssed, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986); Commercial Cotton Co. v. United Cal. Bank,
163 Cal. App. 3d 511, 209 Cal. Rptr. 551 (1985), discussing this good faith requirement in the
context of depository transactions. See also Lofts, The Perdue Case and Other Litigation Involving
Bank Charges, 42 CoNstrmR FIN. L. Q. REP. 97 (1988) [hereinafter Lofts].
32. English v. Fischer, 660 S.W.2d 521, 522 (Tex. 1983). In a recent case, the Texas Court
of Appeals for the Seventh District followed the lead of the Texas Supreme Court in holding
that a special duty of good faith does not arise in a contract setting absent a special relationship
between the parties. See Lovell v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 754 S.W.2d 298 (Tex. App.




Court rejected the Restatement position by expressly holding that as a matter
of general contract law there is no implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. 3" In a concurring opinion, two justices noted that under extant Texas
law an implied covenant of good faith would not override express terms of
a contract. The concurring justices noted, however, that where there is a special
relationship, either because of the element of trust necessary to accomplish
the goal of the undertaking or to correct an imbalance of bargaining power,
prior Texas cases would allow implication of a good faith or fair dealing obliga-
tion.3 4 Two justices dissented, expressly holding that such a covenant is im-
plied .3 The concurring opinion in this case has some obvious appeal where
the parties have not explicitly delineated the terms of their agreement, and
both understand that one party is relying on the honest judgment of the other.
Here, a special relationship is created and the parties should deal with one
another openly in a spirit of good faith and fairness, judged by community
standards of commercial reasonableness.
36
This position has been adopted by several courts.3" It also conforms with
the Texas Court of Appeals decision quoted with approval in Wright.3"
However, imposing a duty of good faith and fairness where a special rela-
tionship exists is far different from imposing a special duty of good faith,
i.e., incorporating community standards or standards of fair dealing and com-
mercial reasonableness, into contracts generally or on lenders specifically, e.g.,
under UCC section 1-201(19)."' Quite a difference exists between the Wright
and Hall position requiring some intentional interference with another party's
rights to the fruits of a contract, and the California and Restatement position
in El Paso, seems to be going its own way and in two recent cases has found (or at least assumed
the existence of) special duties of good faith as an independent basis for liability in the context
of lending transactions. See Coleman v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., No. 08-87-00235-CV
(Tex. App. - El Paso Nov. 23, 1988, writ requested) (not yet reported); Olney Savings & Loan
Assoc. v. Farmers Market of Odessa, Inc., No. 08-88-00113-CV (Jan. 25, 1989) (not yet reported).
See also Aranda v. Ins. Co. of North America, 748 S.W.2d 210 (Tex. 1988); Arnold v. National
County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d 165 (rex. 1987).
33. Id. at 522.
34. Id. at 524. The author of the concurring opinion in English, Justice Spears, wrote a
five-member majority in Aranda v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 748 S.W.2d 210 (rex. 1988), which
has seemingly adopted his viewpoint in the context of a workers' compensation insurer and an
injured employee of a covered insured. A special relation was found to exist, thus justifying
implication of the good faith covenant.
35. English, 660 S.W.2d at 525.
36. Cf. U.C.C. § 2-103(l)(b) (1988) and § 2-104, Comment 2 (1988).
37. Flagship Nat'l Bank v. Gray Distrib. Sys., Inc., 485 So.2d 1336 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1986); Centerre Bank of Kansas City v. Distributors, Inc., 705 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985);
Fulton Nat'l Bank v. Willis Denney Ford, Inc., 154 Ga. App. 846, 269 S.E.2d 916 (1980). See
also Harrell, The Bank Customer Relationship: Evolution of a Modern Form?, 11 OKLA. CrrY
UNrv. L. R v. 641 (1986) [hereinafter Harrell].
38. See supra note 12.
39. As noted, this would be appropriate for merchants selling goods, under section 2-103(l)(b),
but not for lenders generally, since section 1-201(19) is limited by its terms to "honesty in fact"
and does not incorporate standards of commercial reasonableness. See supra notes 6-9 and ac-
companying text. Cf. the quotation from Eke Builders, Inc., supra in the text accompanying
note 29.
19891
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that a general good faith-fair dealing covenant should be implied in every
contract, giving rise to tort liability on the basis of community standards.
The suggestion in Eke Builders, Inc., that a duty of fair dealing incorporating
community standards of commercial reasonableness is appropriate for con-
tracts generally, left lenders with a real concern that the Oklahoma courts
might adopt the more extreme California and Restatement view. 4°
This concern was reinforced by a subsequent Oklahoma case. While reject-
ing the California position that an employer has a legal duty not to terminate
an at-will employee in bad faith, the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Hinson
v. Cameron"' for the first time expressly discussed the implied good faith and
fair dealing covenant. Citing California case law as authority,"2 it held that
"the general principle of good faith and fair dealing is infused by force of
law into every contract.""' The covenant "requires that neither party do
anything that will injure the rights of others to receive the benefits of their
agreements." 4
Hinson raises additional questions, such as whether a breach is actionable
in tort, and whether the standard of good faith is based on a subjective or
objective analysis. For example, a court, when applying the UCC, normally
will construe the statutorily implied good faith covenant from an objective
standpoint. If, however, such a covenant is implied generally in all contracts,
there is no basis for determining whether that covenant should be analyzed
from an objective4s or subjective," viewpoint. Such concerns suggested that
Oklahoma courts might allow juries to review commercial transactions to deter-
mine whether some nebulous "community standard" of fairness is violated
every time a party to a contract cries "foul," resulting in punitive damages
in tort as the "normal" remedy for breach of contract.
Rodgers v. Tecumseh Bank
Many of these concerns seemingly were put to rest when the Oklahoma
Supreme Court decided Rodgers v. Tecumseh Bank.47 In this case the court
squarely faced the issue whether it "should extend the implied-in-law duty
of good faith and fair dealing, now imposed upon contracts of insurance,
40. 714 P.2d at 608-09.
41. 742 P.2d 549 (Okla. 1987). See also Burk v. K-Mart, 770 P.2d 24 (Okla. 1989).
42. Id. at 553 n.13.
43. Id. at 554 (emphasis by the court).
44. Id. at 553.
45. See, e.g., Reid v. Key Bank of S. Maine, Inc., 821 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1987) (dictum); Richards
Eng'rs, Inc. v. Spanel, 745 P.2d 1031 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987).
46. See, e.g., United States v. H&S Realty Co., 647 F. Supp. 1415, 1424 (D. Me. 1986).
If by signing a guaranty, a guarantor acquired the power to second-guess a lender's
every decision in the course of administering a loan, the lender would be caught
in an impossible squeeze and the very purpose of the guaranty would be seriously
undermined. The court believes that the U.C.C.'s "honesty in fact" requirement
and the guarantor's right to negotiate the terms of the guaranty provide sufficient
protection in this situation.




to contracts for commercial loans in order to support a cause of action for
'tortious breach of contract' ."' Merely by answering that question in the
negative, the court clarified several matters. 49 The court's framing of the issues
made it obvious that not every breach of the implied covenant of good faith
will give rise to an action for tortious breach of contract. In addition, the
court did not discuss breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing in terms of a general theory of contractual breach. Apparently that
omission was intentional." As stated by the court, the narrow dispositive issue
was not whether the court "should extend the implied-in-law duty of good
faith and fair dealing, now imposed upon contracts of insurance, to contracts
for commercial loans in order to support a cause of action for 'tortious breach
of contract,' " but rather "whether the facts support a cause of action for
[breach] of the express terms of a written contract." 5' By limiting redress
to breach of contract the court seemed to draw a firm distinction between
contract and tort liabilities and remedies. The court concluded by ruling as
a general proposition that the breach of a commercial lending agreement or-
dinarily will not result in tort liability and, additionally, that the lender can
be deemed to have breached the express terms of a contract without con-
sideration of issues relating to good faith or lack of it.2 This suggests a reaf-
firmation of traditional common law concepts.
In Rodgers v. Tecumseh Bank, Rodgers and his co-borrowers executed a
promissory note and mortgage to Tecumseh Bank. The loan had a one-year
term and the mortgage contained the following language: "Final payment may
be refinanced at any time it is due without penalty and at terms no less
favorable than original terms. '"5 At maturity the bank declined to renew or
extend the loan. In an unusual twist of events for a lender liability case, the
borrowers repaid the loan. Thereafter, they sued the bank alleging both breach
of contract and "tortious breach of contract." Both the borrowers and the
bank moved for summary judgment. The trial court ruled in favor of the
bank and dismissed the petition. The Oklahoma Court of Appeals affirmed
in an unpublished decision. On certiorari, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
vacated the appellate court's opinion and affirmed the trial court's dismissal
of the tortious breach of contract count."' However, it reversed and remanded
the case for a determination of damages against the bank for breach of the
terms of the mortgage contract.
5
48. Id.
49. Presumably this was a reference to the special duties of good faith implied in the in-
surance cases, such as Christian v. American Home Assurance Co., rather than a rejection of the
traditional common law contracts concept illustrated by Hall v. Farmer's Ins. Exch.
50. Id. at 1225. The court simply resorted to rules of contractual construction. Breach vel
non of the covenant under the law of contracts is not addressed.
51. Id. at 1224.
52. Id. at 1226-27.
53. Id. at 1224 (emphasis by the court).
54. Id. at 1227.
55. Id.
1989]
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Adhering to the single transaction view of what is a cause of action or
claim for relief, the Oklahoma Supreme Court noted that "tortious breach
of contract" is simply a theory of recovery and is not a separate claim for
relief.-6 The bank committed only one wrong in the case by refusing to renew
or extend the loan. The court declined the borrowers' invitation to apply the
doctrine of Christian v. American Home Assurance Co." and McCorkle v.
Great Atlantic Ins. Co. by extending the special implied-in-law duty of good
faith and fair dealings applicable in insurance contracts to commercial loan
agreements, which would allow an action in tort for breach of that implied
covenant. The court's refusal in Rodgers to extend that doctrine generally
to commercial loan agreements is premised on "the inherent differences be-
tween insurance policies and commercial loan agreements.""
The principal distinction relied on by the court concerned the basic nature
of an insurance policy as an adhesion contract in which the insured as "the
weaker party has no realistic choice as to its terms." ' 60 In a commercial loan
agreement, however, the transaction is normally a negotiated arrangement with
multiple potential competitors offering contractual concessions to obtain the
business. 6' Indeed, in Rodgers the court noted that the borrower was a
sophisticated investor and that:
The borrowers shopped around and came to the bank because it
offered the most favorable interest rates, and in negotiating the
contract the borrowers were successful in having a favorable term
inserted into the printed form. Here we have arm's-length
negotiating, a relatively equal bargaining capacity and no snares
or traps for the unwary, quite unlike the circumstances surround-
ing the issuance of an insurance policy. 62
Significantly, the court noted the absence of any "special relationship" under
the facts of the case. As discussed later, a "special relationship" traditionally
is a prerequisite to a fiduciary-like duty, which in turn gives rise to strict limita-
tions on transactions between the parties. Rather, and in keeping with prior
pronouncements on the subject, the court stated that absent such a relation-
ship, "[p]arties should be free to contract for any lawful purpose and upon
such terms as they believe to be in their mutual interest." ' 63 The court further
noted that imposing tort liability generally on commercial lenders for breach
of a contract "would only serve to chill commercial transactions.' ' 4 The court
was careful, however, not to foreclose resort to the theory of tortious breach
56. Id. at 1227.
57. 577 P.2d 899 (Okla. 1977).
58. 637 P.2d 583 (Okla. 1981).
59. 756 P.2d at 1226.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1226.
63. Id. at 1226-27.




of contract"5 when a breach is grossly reckless or wantonly iegligent.66
The court closed its discussion of the primary issue with this somewhat
enigmatic paragraph:
Lastly, in Christian we found a pre-existing statutory duty imposed
upon insurers to make immediate payment of claims. Further, com-
mercial transactions under 12A O.S. 1981, § 1.203 [sic] carry an
obligation of good faith in their performance and enforcement.
Likewise, under the common law each contract carries an implicit
and mutual covenant to act towards each other in good faith. 67
Because Christian was based on a statute, that line of decisions is further
distinguished. The reason the court mentions section 1-203 of the UCC and
the now squarely articulated common law implied covenant of mutual good
faith is unclear.6 8 The language is not essential to the opinion as the breach
of contract claim was resolved by rules of construction and without mention
of any implied covenants. Is the court hinting that in some cases an indepen-
dent claim for relief in contract will lie for breach of the implied good faith
covenant either under the UCC 69 or common law? Or is the court merely
reaffirming its adherence to traditional contract concepts of good faith, as
illustrated by Hall? These authors lean toward the latter view, but the full
implications are not yet clear.
Although the court's decision in Rodgers v. Tecumseh Bank should be ap-
plauded as a setback to those who would turn every breach of contract into
a tort or every relation into a fiduciary one, many questions still remain
unanswered. Is the breach of the good faith covenant simply a shield (an af-
firmative defense to enforcement of the express terms of a contract), or may
it be used offensively as a sword? Will breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing without breach of an express provision of an agree-
ment constitute a claim upon which relief may be granted? Will the court
extend the Christian line of cases to consumer lending contracts, which typically
are not the result of arm's-length negotiations between persons of relatively
equal bargaining power? Finally, what is the "special relationship" that will
give rise to circumstances under which the court might impose Christian-like
or fiduciary liabilities on a lender? The lack of this "special relationship"
in Rodgers was central to the court's decision: "Where, as here, there is no
special relationship, parties should be free "to contract for any lawful pur-
pose and upon such terms as they believe to be in their best interest." ' 70 Ob-
viously, the rejection of implied-in-law duties of good faith and fair dealing
as a basis for liability, and perhaps even the rejection of punitive damages
in lending transactions, was far from absolute. The court suggested that
65. See Note, Tortious Breach of Contract in Oklahoma, 20 TULsA L.J. 233 (1984).
66. 756 P.2d at 1227.
67. Id.
68. 12A Oxi.A. STAT. § 1-203 (1981).
69. Id. See also supra notes 7 & 9.
70. 756 P.2d at 1226-27.
1989]
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"[g]ross recklessness or wanton negligence" in the context of a "special rela-
tionship" might call for application of a theory of recovery based on tortious
breach of contract. 7 ' Nonetheless, the court's refusal to impose tort liability
as a matter of course, based on implied-in-law duties of good faith and fair
dealing, is a victory for sound application of the common law and the Uniform
Commercial Code. It is also a rejection of theories that would seek to include
a tort or breach of fiduciary duty in every contract dispute.7
Is Rodgers v. Tecumseh Bank Part of an Emerging Trend?
Two important cases from other jurisdictions suggest that other courts also
are reacting against some of the more extreme lender liability cases." In Kruse
v. Bank of America7" and Penthouse International, Ltd. v. Dominion Federal
Savings & Loan Ass'n,7" a state appellate court on the West Coast and a
federal court of appeals on the East Coast, respectively, dealt with divergent
fact patterns and wrote opinions strikingly similar to Rodgers. They each sug-
gested limitations on a borrower's right to recover for breach of good faith
under a "special" or fiduciary relationship theory and other "lender liabili-
ty" theories.
In Kruse the district court held the lender liable because it was involved
in a series of transactions that led the borrower to expand its operation. The
borrower assisted and then purchased the business of a troubled apple-
processing plant with which the borrower (an apple grower) did business, ap-
parently on the expectation that the bank would provide financing. Both
businesses were customers of the bank, and the bank's refusal to extend a
line of credit to the troubled processor prompted the series of assistance tran-
sactions between that processor and the apple grower. The apple grower
periodically sought the bank's help in assisting the processor. When the apple
grower ultimately purchased the troubled processor, and then itself suffered
reverses and filed bankruptcy (partly, it was alleged, because the bank con-
tinued to decline to extend the necessary financing), the parties sued the bank.
The allegations included fraud, bad faith, interference with the business, and
infliction of emotional distress, and the jury returned a verdict of almost $47
million in direct and punitive damages.
The California Court of Appeals reversed the jury verdict. The court dis-
counted the plaintiffs' theories of special or fiduciary relationships, suggesting
that even if such a duty existed it was not breached in this case, and noted
the absence of any evidence of fraud.76 The court further concluded that the
71. Id.
72. The bank was held liable for breach of contract, but nothing more. Id. at 1225.
73. For a more thorough discussion of these two cases from a national perspective, see Dennis
& Endler, Bank of America and Penthouse, Is the Lender Liability Pendulum Swinging Back?
43 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 3 (1989) [hereinafter Dennis & Endler].
74. 202 Cal. App. 3d 38, 248 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 870 (1989).
75. 665 F. Supp. 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), modified 855 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied
April 3, 1989.
76. 202 Cal. App. 3d 38, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 225. The Kruse court perceptibly characterized




borrowers' reliance on an expectation of further financing was not reasonable
under the facts of this case, and it emphasized that even in a fiduciary rela-
tionship the beneficiary has an obligation to investigate "facts of which he
has actual notice." 7 Although, as discussed later,7 8 there was speculation that
this case might be reviewed by the California Supreme Court, that did not
occur. 7 This case, like Rodgers v. Tecumseh Bank, may represent an impor-
tant milestone in defining the limits of lender liability in the context of a
bank's "special relationship" and in defining the limits of the duty of good
faith to the bank's customers and potential customers.
Several important aspects of the court's analysis stand out in Kruse v. Bank
of America. First, as in Rodgers, the court was unwilling to extend special
protections to a lending transaction per se where the borrower was a
sophisticated business person.8 0 In both cases the courts emphasized the arm's-
length nature of transactions between equally sophisticated parties and held
each party to a standard of reasonable responsibility for protecting its own
interests. In effect this reaffirms the common law characterization of the
basic relationship as one of debtor-creditor rather than beneficiary-fiduciary.
Together these cases represent a significant reaffirmation of private contract
law rather than public policy as the guide for resolving private commercial
disputes.
Like Rodgers, Kruse involved unique facts limiting its usefulness as a broad
principle of law. Moreover, like Rodgers, Kruse does not represent a total
repudiation of the theories involving good faith or special relationships in
a lender context. For example, the California Court of Appeals repeatedly
rejected the plaintiffs' theories of bad faith breach on grounds that there was
no contract between the parties because the borrowers' expectation of a loan
was both unreasonable and inadequate as the sole basis for formation of a
contract.2 Nonetheless, the court seemed to reject the rationale of cases such
as Djowharzadeh v. City National Bank & Trust Co.83 and Jacques v. First
Nat'l. Bank of Maryland,4 which recognized such good faith duties as
arising from the "special relationship" between a bank and its potential
customers. While the latter cases are easily distinguishable because they in-
volved less sophisticated parties" or clearer evidence of wrongdoing by the
163 Cal. App. 3d 511, 209 Cal. Rptr. 551 (1985), as representing "murky waters" which it ap-
parently was pleased to avoid.
77. 202 Cal. App. 3d 38, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 226-27, and 227 n.10, citing Miller v. Bechtel
Corp., 33 Cal. 3d 868, 663 P.2d 177, 191 Cal. Rptr. 619 (1983); Bedolla v. Logan & Frazer,
52 Cal. App. 3d 118, 125 Cal. Rptr. 59 (1975).
78. See infra text accompanying at note 87.
79. See infra note 123.
80. 202 Cal. App. 3d 38, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 231.
81. Id., 248 Cal. Rptr. at 231.
82. Id., 248 Cal. Rptr. 228-33.
83. 646 P.2d 616 (Okla. Ct. App. 1982), discussed infra at text and accompanying notes
102-104. See also Harrell, supra note 37, at 642-47.
84. 307 Md. 527, 515 A.2d 756 (1986). See also infra text accompanying note 104.
85. It is not clear that this is a distinguishing characteristic in Djowharzadeh.
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banker,6 the inescapable conclusion is still that Kruse and Rodgers sharply
limit the intrusion of special good faith and fiduciary duty concepts into general
contracts law in the context of a lending transaction. But no one can logically
contend that under Kruse or Rodgers this intrusion has been wholly
eliminated.
87
Penthouse adds further fiber to this body of law. In Penthouse a lender
refused to close a lending transaction to which it had committed on grounds
that the borrower had not met the conditions stipulated in the loan commit-
ment. The trial court concluded that the lender was acting in bad faith by
insisting on an excessively strict compliance with the terms of the commit-
ment in an effort to escape from the deal.88 The Second Circuit rejected this
view, upholding the right of the lender to insist on strict compliance with
the loan commitment terms.89
Once again this decision represents a rejection of broad and expansive con-
cepts of good faith or a "special relationship" as a basis for imposing special
liability in a commercial setting. As in Rodgers and Kruse, the court emphasized
that this was an arm's-length transaction between sophisticated parties, and
defined that relationship by the contract terms rather than by reference to
obligations implied in law. While Penthouse raises some troubling questions
regarding the relationship between lead and participating lenders, 9° in the area
of lender-borrower relations it clearly joins Rodgers and Kruse as a reaffirm-
ation of the primacy of contract law over public policy considerations for
defining the rights of private parties in commercial transactions.
Kruse is particularly noteworthy for its emphasis on the concept of justifiable
reliance. For example, the opinion uses the term "justifiable reliance" (or
equivalent words) roughly ten times in two and a half pages. 91 The heart of
the opinion seems to be that the borrower's reliance on its expectations of
additional financing was not justifiable, and as a result, no special relation-
ship or duty of good faith arose. 92 If this is indeed the case, then the initial
inquiry must be whether the parties' relationship gives rise to a level of
justifiable reliance sufficient to create a "special relationship" and concom-
86. This factor more validly distinguishes Djowharzadeh.
87. The Kruse court did, however, narrowly construe the case of Seaman's Direct Buying
Serv., Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d 782, 686 P.2d 1158, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984),
which recognized a creative theory for allowing tort recovery for bad faith denials of a contract.
202 Cal. App. 3d 38, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 228, citing Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc., 40 Cal.
3d 488, 709 P.2d 837, 220 Cal. Rptr. 818 (1985). Also, in Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47
Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal. Rptr. 654 (1988), the California Supreme Court refused
to extend the tort remedy for implied breach of good faith beyond insurance cases. The Foley
court implied that the allusion in the Seaman's case to the potential for extending tort remedies
was tentative at best.
88. 665 F. Supp. at 310.
89. 855 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied April 3, 1989.
90. See, e.g., Dennis & Endler, supra note 73.
91. 202 Cal. App. 3d 38, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 226-28.




mitant special duties of good faith and fair dealing, as in the insurance cases. 93
Clearly in the right circumstances any of these courts would recognize a kind
of "special relationship" giving rise to such duties. But each of these cases
dealt with a transaction which, for the reasons stated by the courts, did not
rise to the level of a "special relationship." Therefore further examination
is necessary to attempt delineation of the possible boundaries and implica-
tions of such a relationship.
The Elements and Consequences of a "Special Relationship"
The concept of a confidential or special relationship has long been recognized
in Oklahoma. 94 A typical description is:
A confidential relation arises by reason of kinship, between parties,
or professional, business, or social relations that would reasonably
lead an ordinary prudent person in the management of his business
affairs to repose that degree of confidence in the defendant which
largely results in the substitution of the will of the defendant for
that of the plaintiff in material matters involved in the transaction."
As this suggests, the definition of a "special relationship" is likely to be broad
and fluid. In 1927 the Oklahoma Supreme Court quoted Pomeroy's definition:
It has been said that [a special relation] exists, and that relief is
granted, in all cases in which influence has been acquired and
abused, in which confidence has been reposed and betrayed. The
origin of the confidence and the source of the influence are im-
material. The rule embraces both technical fiduciary relations and
those informal relations which exist whenever one man trusts in
and relies upon another. The only question is, Does such a rela-
tion in fact exist?96
The most recent pronouncement by the Oklahoma Supreme Court is consis-
tent with the broad, nonspecific approach articulated by these authorities and
earlier case law. In Lowrance v. Patton,97 the Supreme Court unanimously
stated:
In determining whether a fiduciary relationship was established,
there are several rules couched in general terms which have been
93. As suggested by Rodgers and Kruse, an important part of this inquiry would depend
on the relative sophistication of the parties and the extent to which the transaction was negotiated
at arm's-length.
94. See Hayes v. Thornsbrough, 180 Okla. 357, 69 P.2d 664 (1937); Brown v. Trent, 36
Okla. 239, 128 P. 895 (1912).
95. Sellers v. Sellers, 428 P.2d 230, 231 (Okla. 1967) (syllabus 1). See also Hamburg v. Doak,
207 Okla. 517, 251 P.2d 510, 514 (1952); Derdyn v. Low, 94 Okla. 41, 220 P. 945 (1923) (syllabus
1).
96. McDaniel v. Schroeder, 128 Okla. 91, 261 P. 224, 226 (1927).
97. 710 P.2d 108 (Okla. 1985).
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adopted to serve as a guide in the determination of this question.
It is settled law that courts of equity will not set any bounds to
the facts and circumstances out of which a fiduciary relationship
may spring. It includes not only all legal relationships such as guar-
dian and ward, attorney and client, principal and agent, and the
like, but it extends to every possible case from which there is con-
fidence reposed on one side and resulting domination and influence
on the other. The relationship need not be legal but it may be either
moral, social, domestic or merely personal. Therefore, a fiduciary
relationship which is recognized and enforced equitably does not
rest on any particular legal relationship.
Rather, a fiduciary relationship springs from an attitude of trust
and confidence and it is based on some form of agreement, either
express or implied, from which it can be said the minds have been
met to create a mutual obligation."
Interestingly, the court did not cite any Oklahoma cases as authority for its
statement, but relied on four Tenth Circuit decisions. 9
The debtor-creditor relation created in a loan transaction is by nature essen-
tially one of contract. If, however, there is a meeting of the minds, express
or implied, in which can be inferred an additional special obligation of trust
and confidence, then a fact finder may find that a fiduciary or confidential
relation exists. If that critical relation is found to exist, the burden of proof
shifts from the claimant-borrower to the fiduciary-lender to prove by clear
and convincing evidence that no advantage was taken and that the transac-
tion was fair and conscientious.' 0
The common thread running throughout these descriptions of special or
fiduciary relationship is the concept of reliance. In virtually all the special
or fiduciary relationship cases involving lenders, the court has focused on
some aspect of the transaction that led the injured party to a justified belief
that he could abandon independent judgment and rely instead on his trust
in the other party. This concept of reliance has been identified in previous
commentary, especially regarding banking transactions,' 0' but has not received
adequate attention or been fully recognized as the essential ingredient in many
lender liability cases.
98. Id. at 111-12.
99. See Raeder v. Boyd, 252 F.2d 585 (10th Cir. 1957) (federal common law applied); Appleman
v. Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas, 217 F.2d 843 (10th Cir. 1955) (Kansas law; joint venture); Oldland
v. Gray, 179 F.2d 408 (10th Cir. 1950) (Colorado law; cited Oklahoma cases); Blackner v.
McDermott, 176 F.2d 498 (10th Cir. 1949) (Wyoming law; joint venture).
100. See, e.g., Lawson v. Haynes, 170 F.2d 741 (10th Cir. 1949) ("small town banker" taking
advantage of "ignorant farmer"); Looney v. Chastain, 395 P.2d 571, 574 (Okla. 1964); Mattingly
v. Sisler, 198 Okla. 107, 175 P.2d 796 (1947); Moore v. Moore, 167 Okla. 365, 29 P.2d 961
(1934) (syllabus 1, 2).
101. See, e.g., Harrell, supra note 37; Symons, The Bank-Customer Relation: Part I-The
Relevance of Contract Doctrine, 100 BANK. L.J. 220 (1983); Part If-The Judicial Decisions,




A Review of Oklahoma Lender Liability Case Law
The starting point in any review of Oklahoma jurisprudence regarding the
potential and nature of a financial institution's "special relationship" with
a customer or potential customer is Djowharzadeh v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co. I" Djowharzadeh dealt with the kind of relationship created when a pros-
pective borrower applies for a loan. The court said:
The relationship created when a prospective borrower applies for
a loan from a bank is a very special one. It has not yet ripened
into a contract-because it has not yet crossed the threshold of
formal agreement. Neither is it fiducial-because it is by nature
an arm's length transaction. It does, however, impose special duties
on each party which go beyond mere matters of courtesy.
We hold ... Bank's relationship to a loan applicant implicitly im-
poses the duty to keep the contents of loan applications confiden-
tial. This duty has existed traditionally and continues to exist, if
not specifically in the law books, at least in the mind of the public
in general and within the banking community in particular.
10 3
Djowharzadeh has no precedential value in Oklahoma because it was decided
by the Oklahoma Court of Appeals. It has, however, been cited with some
limited approval by a court of last resort."'
The latest example in Oklahoma's reported case law in which a court has
attempted as a matter of law to impress a fiduciary-like quality on a relation
qua relation is Smith v. Citizens State Bank of Hugo.'5 In Smith, Judge
Brightmire wrote "a bank has a duty to deal fairly and honestly with its
depositors and to do otherwise can subject it to principles of estoppel, as
well as a charge of bad faith breach of contract."' 6 In a supporting footnote
he stated: "Bad faith breach of afiduciary duty (such as exists between bank
and depositor) will support punitive damages."'0 7 To support this leap of faith
Judge Brightmire cited a decision he authored in McCarroll v. Reed standing
for the proposition that such damages may be awarded for the breach of the
physician-patient fiduciary relation.0 8 That opinion in turn relied on language
from Timmons v. Royal Globe Ins. Co.,'19 a case involving a misuse of con-
fidential information by an insurance company. Again, Timmons is based
on Christian v. American Home Assurance Co.," which found a "special
102. 646 P.2d 616 (Okla. Ct. App. 1982), discussed in Harrell, supra note 37, at 642-47.
103. 646 P.2d at 619-20.
104. See Jacques v. First Nat'l Bank of Maryland, 307 Md. 527, 515 A.2d 756, 763 (1986).
105. 732 P.2d 911, 913 (Okla. Ct. App. 1986).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 913 n.1 (emphasis added).
108. 679 P.2d 851, 854 (Okla. Ct. App. 1984).
109. 653 P.2d 907 (Okla. 1982).
110. 577 P.2d at 902.
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relationship" of good faith inherent in the dealings between an insurer and
its insured."' As discussed previously, in Rodgers the Oklahoma Supreme
Court recently rejected an effort to extend the Christian rationale to lending
transactions. In addition, the language in Smith suggesting there is a fiduciary
relation is directly contrary to settled Oklahoma case law that the bank-
depositor relationship, without limitation or qualification, is a debtor-creditor,
and therefore contractual, relationship."' Clearly, more than just the bank-
customer relationship is necessary to create the kind of "special relationship"
leading to imposition of a fiduciary relationship or other special obligations.
Case Law from Other Jurisdictions
Not surprisingly, California, the birthplace of the good faith/fair dealing
implied-covenant doctrine, has gone the farthest in finding a confidential rela-
tionship in the bank-customer context. One particular decision concerning a
bank's relationship with its depositors is Commercial Cotton Co. v. United
California Bank." 3 In Commercial Cotton the appellate court stated with
regard to the bank-customer relationship: "The relationship of a bank to a
depositor is at least quasi-fiduciary, and depositors reasonably expect a bank
not to claim nonexistent legal defenses to avoid reimbursement when the bank
negligently disburses the entrusted funds.""' This broad, consumerist
characterization of the relationship does not seem to have spread beyond the
borders of California. It has, however, spread to the bank-lender relationship
in California. In Barrett v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Savings Ass'n, 11
the court held the trial court erred in refusing a constructive trust instruction
where loan customers shared confidential information about unfavorable
developments with a banker, relied on the banker in seeking a merger, and
111. Id.
112. W.R. Grimshaw Co. v. First Nat'l Bank & Tr. Co., 563 P.2d 117 (Okla. 1977); Ingram
v. Liberty Nat'l Bank & Tr. Co., 533 P.2d 975 (Okla. 1975); Waitman v. Waitman, 505 P.2d
171 (Okla. 1972). A bank can possibly incur fiduciary-like responsibilities in a depository con-
text. That may occur where there is a qualification or limitation on the deposit, or in the case
of a general, unqualified deposit where there has been a misappropriation of trust funds in mak-
ing the deposit or, even absent the deposit being a wrongful misappropriation of trust funds,
where the bank has knowledge or notice of an improper withdrawal of funds or that a breach
of trust is being committed by improper withdrawal. Security State Bank of Commanche v. W.R.
Johnston & Co., 204 Okla. 160, 228 P.2d 169 (1951); Board of County Commr's of McCurtain
County v. State Nat'l Bank of Idabel, 160 Okla. 182, 36 P.2d 281 (1934); New Amsterdam Cas.
Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 154 Okla. 74, 6 P.2d 779 (1931); Dempsey Oil & Gas Co. v. Citizens Nat'l
Bank, 110 Okla. 39, 235 P. 1104 (1925).
Where a guarantor is concerned, there is a clear pronouncement that the relation is contrac-
tual. Riverside Nat'l Bank v. Manolakis, 613 P.2d 438, 441 (Okla. 1980). That statement, however,
does not prevent that contractual relation from being characterized as confidential if the re-
quisite facts are present.
113. 163 Cal. App. 3d 511, 209 Cal. Rptr. 551 (1985), discussed in Harrell, supra note 37,
at 648-651. See also Lofts, supra note 31.
114. Id., 209 Cal. Rptr. at 554 (emphasis added). Cf. J. NORTON & S. WImaTY, BANINO
LAW IANuAL § 11.04[l], at 11-28 (1988).
115. 183 Cal. App. 3d 1362, 229 Cal. Rptr. 16 (1986), vacating 178 Cal. App. 3d 360, 224




the banker made conflicting statements to the customers and to a prospective
merger partner."' The appeals court relied on Commercial Cotton Co. in
stating that confidential and fiduciary relationships are, in law, synonymous
and may be said to exist whenever trust or confidence is reposed by one person
in another." 7 The California cases seem to require only that the borrower
or depositor repose trust or confidence in the bank."'
As noted, the California Court of Appeals recently reversed a jury verdict
of over $26 million against Bank of America in the widely noted Kruse v.
Bank of America case.' 19 While the decision turned on the court's reversal
of a number of factual determinations made by a jury (limiting to some ex-
tent its precedential value), the case is important because of its narrow reading
of troublesome California precedents, including the 1984 California Supreme
Court decision in Seaman's Direct Buying Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co. 12 0
There was speculation that the California Supreme Court might use this case
as a vehicle to impose broad fiduciary duties on lenders as the Maryland Court
of Appeals did in Jacques v. First Nat'l Bank of Maryland,'-' (citing the
Oklahoma Court of Appeals decision in Djowharzadeh v. City Nat'l Bank
& Trust Co. of Norman'22 with limited approval), but apparently this was
not to be.'23 Kruse may represent a significant backtracking by the California
courts toward the more traditional position evidenced by Rodgers v. Tecumseh
Bank.
Consistent with this, Oklahoma traditionally requires evidence of reliance
plus some element of domination or influence as the standard prerequisites
to a "special relationship." 124 These requirements are consistent with most
cases from other jurisdictions. While the Oklahoma courts may not have ar-
ticulated a "community standard" to determine whether there is a special,
fiduciary, or confidential relationship, the cases indicate that the facts of each
case will dictate whether such a relationship may be found. Investigating the
kinds of factual situations where such a relationship has or has not been found,
in Oklahoma and in other states, is useful as means of refining the concept
of "special relationship" into an element of commercial law in Oklahoma.
Examples of a "Special Relationship"
In Smith v. Saginaw Savings & Loan Ass'n, 125 a fiduciary relation-
ship was found between a bank and a frail elderly couple where an eager
116. Id., 229 Cal. Rptr. at 18.
117. Id., 229 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
118. Whether the California courts require any form of justification for this reliance or whether
it is being recognized as a matter of law due to special characteristics of the bank-customer
relation is unclear. See Harrell, supra note 37, at 679-82.
119. Kruse v. Bank of Am., 202 Cal. App. 3d 38, 248 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1988), cert. denied
109 S. Ct. 870 (1989). See also supra notes 73-93 and accompanying text.
120. 36 Cal.3d 752, 686 P.2d 1158, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984).
121. 307 Md. 527, 515 A.2d 756 (1985). See also supra notes 83-84, 102-104.
122. 646 P.2d 616 (Okla. Ct. App. 1982). See also supra notes 83-84, 102-104.
123. Seamans, 686 P.2d at 1171.
124. Lowrance v. Patton, 710 P.2d 108, 111 (Okla. 1985).
125. 94 Mich. App. 263, 288 N.W.2d 613 (1979).
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loan officer agreed not only to loan the plaintiffs money for the construction
of their home, but also approved the builder (whom he knew to be in finan-
cial trouble), the building contract, and the building specifications. The plain-
tiffs lived approximately 250 miles from the proposed building site. The loan
officer also agreed to make sure the construction was completed without cost
overruns and promised that no money would be released to the prime con-
tractor until the work was actually completed. The unique facts of this case
supported the finding by a Michigan appellate court of a relationship whereby
the plaintiffs reposed faith, confidence, and trust in the judgment and advice
of the lender.
Similarly, following the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 551 (1977), the
Iowa Court of Appeals held that a twenty-year relationship between a lender
and guarantor had ripened into a fiduciary relationship.' 26 In this case the
lender persuaded the guarantor to grant a large mortgage on her unen-
cumbered, exempt homestead to secure a preexisting debt but did not advise
her that her homestead could not otherwise have been reached by the lender.
The guarantor's husband had just suffered a heart attack at the time she mort-
gaged the homestead.
In another case involving a farm, a jury gave the bank judgment on its
$700,000 debt but granted the family farmers an award of $1,040,000 for
the lender's breach of fiduciary duties.'2 7 The bank had advised the debtor-
family farmer when and how to market products, how to manage the farm
operation, and had assisted the plaintiffs in analyzing their financial posi-
tion. The bank even had induced the farmer to fire his independent marketing
consultant. The court submitted the case to the jury on the theories of
negligence in structuring loans and economic duress exerted by the lender in
persuading the debtors to follow its advice. The case was settled pending
appeal.
A lender who takes control of a company to liquidate its assets and satisfy
its own debt may experience equitable subordination of its claim to the claims
of all general unsecured creditors. 2 In In re American Lumber Co.,29 because
the lender exercised excessive control, including taking physical possession of
the premises, terminating the borrower's employees in excess of those necessary
for liquidation, becoming the sole signatory on the borrower's checks, monitor-
ing the borrower's mail, and paying only those general unsecured creditors
who would assist the lender in the liquidation process, the lender was placed
in a fiduciary position not only to the borrower but to the unsecured
creditors.' 30 Once that relation was established, the concomitant duty to deal
fairly and impartially with a debtor and its creditors arose.
126. Peoples Bank & Tr. Co. v. Lala, 392 N.W.2d 179, 186 (Iowa Ct. App. 1986).
127. Dennis v. BankOhio Nat'l Bank, No. 18738 (Ohio Ct. Corn. Pleas, Perry County 1986).
This case is noted in Moss, Banking, A.B.A.J. 67 (1987). Cf. State Nat'l Bank of El Paso v.
Farah Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. Civ. App. 1984) writ dismissed, agreement.
128. 11 U.S.C. § 510 (1982).
129. 7 Bankr. 519 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1979), affirmed 5 Bankr. 470 (D. Minn. 1980).




In another case the court found an implied partnership in a situation where
a lender overreached.' 3' In Security Pacific Natl Bank v. Williams,132 a
trial judge awarded a borrower $2.3 million in compensatory damages and
$2.5 million in punitive damages, based on findings that the lender had a
fiduciary relationship with the owner of a car dealership the lender financed,
and that the lender misled the owner into taking certain actions respecting
his business that caused him injury. In that case Williams operated a Buick
dealership in San Diego. He was a favored customer of the bank. In early
1979, Williams and his loan officer, Ross, in whom he placed a great deal
of trust, met to discuss Williams' purchase of a second car dealership. Ross
vetoed several of Williams' suggestions and even threatened to "pull the chain"
on Williams' loans if Williams persisted. Then Ross indicated to Williams
that he should purchase a dealership in Los Angeles called Viking Dodge.
Ross offered Security Pacific's assistance with the purchase. Ross was familiar
with Viking Dodge because it was one of his troubled loans. During negotia-
tions Ross made some fraudulent representations to Williams about Viking's
finances. Later that year the gasoline crisis struck California. Ultimately
Williams had to turn over Viking Dodge to Chrysler Credit, which then ob-
tained a deficiency judgment against him. Security Pacific became increasing-
ly difficult on Williams' original Buick operation. Ross urged Williams to
find a new investor but refused to provide a letter assuring the investor of
the bank's continued financial support. Williams then filed bankruptcy. In
sustaining Williams' counterclaim in the bank's suit on Williams' guaranty,
the trial court found that a relationship of trust existed: "The Williams-Security
Pacific National Bank relationship went far beyond a lender-borrower rela-
tionship. It was an all-encompassing, mutually beneficial, day-to-day relation-
ship in which both sides reposed trust and confidence in one another....
The relationship here had much the makings of a mutually beneficial partner-
ship."' 33 This idea of mutuality is consistent with the Oklahoma Supreme
Court's language in Lowrance v. Patton'34 and Rodgers v. Tecumseh Bank.
Oklahoma, therefore, possibly would find a fiduciary or special relation in
a case such as Williams.
35
Not every egregious situation, however, results in a finding of a confiden-
tial relation. In Kurth v. Van Horn, 36 a bank was not liable for allowing
a sick eighty-year old man to mortgage his farm to help a tenant.'
37 No evidence
was presented that the elderly borrower relied on the bank for advice, nor
was there any showing that the bank misled him. The bank did not have a
duty to demand that he secure counsel because "this form of protectionism
131. The facts are taken from Chaitman, The Ten Commandments for Avoiding Lender Liability
(Annotated), in CURRENT Issurs iN LENDER LuLIrrY (4th ed. 1987).
132. Nos. 457727 and 457728 (Super. Ct. of San Diego County, Cal. 1986).
133. Id. (emphasis added).
134. 710 P.2d 108 (Okla. 1985).
135. See Rollison v. Muir, 163 Okla. 266, 21 P.2d 1062, 1065 (1932).
136. 380 N.W.2d 693 (Iowa 1986).
137. Id. at 694.
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goes beyond the banker's responsibility in this case. ' 1 3 8 In other words, the
bank had no affirmative duty to prevent the old man from doing what the
evidence clearly showed he wanted to do. The Iowa court followed the Kansas
decision in Denison State Bank v. Madeira,'39 which held that as a matter
of law a bank was not a fiduciary to a potential buyer of a customer's business
where the buyer could have discovered substantial seller overdrafts at the bank
just by looking at the seller's records.
In another case, in overruling a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted, the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia ruled that a loan broker who took an applica-
tion for a home loan from consumers and passed it on to a permanent lender
owed the applicants a duty of good faith and fair dealing, may have owed
them a duty to act in their best interests and, therefore, may have occupied
a fiduciary relation to the applicants.' ° The court focused on both the flex-
ible definition of fiduciary in the District of Columbia and concentrated on
the finding of a "special confidential relationship" that transcended an or-
dinary business transaction requiring each party to act with the interests of
the other in mind.
In Shiplett v. First Sec. Bank of Livingston, 4' the Montana Supreme
Court found that no special circumstances were present to create an excep-
tion to the general rule that a bank's relationship with its customer is not
confidential. The gist of the Shipletts' complaint was that in 1978 the bank
agreed to loan them money at a 10 percent rate for five years but did not
do so. In January 1978, the Shipletts signed a note that did not contain the
five-year term. In renewing the debt in 1979, they signed a note that did not
contain either the five-year term or the 10 percent rate. A FmHA guaranty
of the loan expired in 1984. In order to renew the debt and obtain a new
FmHA guaranty, the Shipletts, after negotiations in which they were
represented by counsel, executed new loan documents containing more onerous
terms. The next month they sued the lender. The court noted that while the
bank had advised the Shipletts on the operation of their ranch, that advice
was not always heeded and, in fact, the Shipletts believed they knew more
about ranching than did the bank's agent. Also important to the decision
was the fact that they were represented by counsel. Under these facts the
absence of sufficient reliance was fatal to the claim of fiduciary liability.
Earlier in 1988 the same Montana court found that a confidential relation
did exist in a breach of credit line agreement case.' 2 There the bank encouraged
and advised the borrowers to expand a cattle operation and "participated
in and encouraged the changes" made in the borrowers' operation. In view
138. Id. at 697.
139. 230 Kan. 684, 640 P.2d 1235 (1982): "A person who is not under any disability or disad-
vantage may not abandon all caution and responsibility for his own protection and unilaterally
impose a fiduciary relationship on another without a conscious assumption of such duties by
the one sought to be held liable as a fiduciary." (syllabus 10 by the court, 640 P.2d at 1237).
140. High v. McLean Fin. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 1561, 1568 (D.D.C. 1987).
141. 762 P.2d 242 (Mont. 1988).




of the fact that the bank effectively controlled the debtors' finances, the bor-
rower had no other financial choice, the parties were in an unequal bargain-
ing position, and the bank actually participated in the borrowers' decision,
a confidential relationship existed and liability was imposed.
Another interesting case involving fiduciary liability also comes from Mon-
tana. In Deist v. Wachholz," 3 a bank officer, but not the bank itself, was
found to have occupied a fiduciary position to the bank customer. The plain-
tiff and her deceased husband had a relation with the bank lasting more than
twenty-four years. The nature of the association and the widow's reliance,
combined with her husband's years of dealing with the bank on essentially
the same matters, were held to be sufficient to make a prima facie case of
the existence of a fiduciary relation. The bank's marketing officer became
a silent partner with a party who ultimately purchased the widow's ranch.
The wrong that occurred was that the bank officer did not disclose "fairly
and honestly all the information which might be presumed to have influenced
[the plaintiff] in the transaction." 144 In refuting the bank officer's contention
that the judgment exonerating the bank but imposing fiduciary liability on
him was nonsensical, the Montana court stated that an individual may incur
a fiduciary duty coextensive with the "internal association" that gave rise
to the duty."' "The bank was unquestionably involved in the sale of the ranch,
and [the marketing officer] was not so detached that imposition of fiduciary
responsibilities would be impermissible."146
In a construction lending case, a complaint by a contractor against a lender
has recently been reinstated. In refusing to apply the trial court's balancing
test, the New Mexico Court of Appeals ruled that "a bank can be held account-
able under a given set of facts to both the customer and the third party."
' 47
Allowing a jury to balance the duty of confidentiality to a customer versus
a duty to disclose facts so that the contractor will not be working to his detri-
ment was held to be "unworkable." Instead, the factfinder should determine
whether there are special circumstances that give rise to a duty of disclosure
to the third party notwithstanding the established duty of confidentiality to
the customer. While the case is typically fact specific, it stands for the pro-
positions that the concept of a confidential relation is very fluid and that
an abuse of a reliance or confidence is actionable even in the context of a
third party who is otherwise not dealing with the bank.
Conclusion
While there is no simple litmus test for determining when a relationship
becomes one of confidence or trust, such a relationship has been found in
143. 208 Mont. 207, 678 P.2d 188 (1984).
144. Id., 678 P.2d at 195.
145. "Equity is not compromised by holding [the defendant bank marketing officer] to a
fiduciary duty to [plaintiff widow] in those dealings intimately associated with the offices of
the Bank, so long as the duty reaches no further than the internal association that gave rise
to it." Id., 678 P.2d at 194.
146. Id.
147. R.A. Peck, Inc. v. Liberty Fed. Say. Bank, 766 P.2d 928 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988).
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a borrower-lender context when the borrower places trust or confidence in
some representation by the lender. Generally this requires several findings:
some affirmative act by the lender inducing a justifiable reliance on the part
of the borrower; a genuine imbalance of bargaining power between the parties;
an extraordinary scope to the parties' relation; express or implied acceptance
by the lender of the borrower's trust; and finally, some unsavory dealing by
the lender for its own interest dehors the relation with the borrower. Most
aggrieved borrowers are unlikely to plead, 48 much less prove, a claim based
on fiduciary duty or a special relationship without meeting most of these re-
quirements. By the same token, however, in those instances where the lender
has overreached in a context of confidence, that lender has a very good reason
to be concerned if the aggrieved borrower asserts a claim for breach of a
fiduciary or confidential relation.
While Rodgers v. Tecumseh Bank and the other recent cases do not define
the parameters of these issues, they strongly suggest that, absent some special
relationship or grossly willful abuse of trust, lenders will not be liable for
punitive damages in tort for breach of a lending agreement. As noted, the
single most significant factor emerging from these opinions is the importance
of the doctrine of justifiable reliance as the basis for imposition of special
obligations in a contracts setting. These cases indicate that reliance is the foun-
dation on which allegations of a special relationship and duties of good faith
and fair dealing must be built. As a result, cases like Rodgers, Kruse, and
Penthouse recognize a reduced level of lender responsibility in contractual
arrangements that have been negotiated at arm's-length between parties of
roughly equal sophistication. However, within this broad statement lies the
potential for a myriad of qualifications and exceptions, suggesting a continued
need for lenders and their counsel to monitor legal developments in this area
and to exercise extreme caution in the interpretation and enforcement of loan
agreements.
148. See the 1987 amendment to section 11 of the Oklahoma Pleading Code. That now tracks
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, which adopts an objective standard for a pleader. Theretofore,
original section 11 of the Pleading Code embodies a subjective standard which allowed a pleader
to claim most anything with impunity.
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